Is Mexico the Emerging Leader of Latin America in Post-Carbon Politics? by Waty, Eddy
Pepperdine Policy Review
Volume 8 Article 6
6-4-2015




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr
Part of the Economic Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Pepperdine Policy Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waty, Eddy (2015) "Is Mexico the Emerging Leader of Latin America in Post-Carbon Politics?," Pepperdine Policy Review: Vol. 8,
Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol8/iss1/6




Air pollution is a serious threat to the health and economic development of Latin America, where 
over 100 million people breathe dangerously polluted air. More than 14,700 deaths were caused 
by air pollution in 2010 in Mexico alone. Thus, the Mexican government has pledged to reduce 
CO2 emissions by 30% by 2020. To reach this goal, the Mexican government has several options 
including: 1) a straight carbon tax, to remain in force; 2) a carbon tax evolving to a market-based 
cap-and-trade system; or 3) a carbon tax evolving to a market-based system, with resultant 
revenues dedicated to supporting clean energy initiatives. The argument is made that European 
Union countries and others have shown that a carbon tax can work, with certain safeguards in 
place, but it should transition to a market-based system over time, as this is favored by industry. 
In addition, to support long-term clean air goals and showcase ongoing successes, revenues 
should be used to support the development of renewable energy (RE), which can enroll citizens 
as stakeholders. 
 Option 3 has the potential to support emissions reduction goals, generate economic 
investment and jobs, and improve the population’s health. Mexico has announced firm initiatives 
in this direction. Other Latin American countries are making progress. Brazil has expanded clean 
energy to 15% percent of its total, Chile plans to increase RE to 20% by 2020, and Uruguay is 
inviting solar and wind projects. But no other Latin American country appears to have a plan as 
comprehensive as that of Mexico. Its leadership and example could thus serve as a model for 
Latin America, if its government follows up on its promises. 
 
1. Introduction 
Mexico is the second most populous country in Latin America, with a population of 118.4 
million as of 2013. Brazil is the largest country, with 203 million people. Mexico’s nominal GDP 
was $1.26 trillion in 2013, and its GDP per capita was $10,310 in that year (The World Bank, 
2014a). It has an EPI (Environmental Performance Index) score of 55.03 in 2014, ranked 65 out 
of 178 countries which is ahead of other Latin American countries with large urban populations 
such as Brazil (77) and Argentina (93) (Yale, 2014). 
 According to the World Bank, Mexico’s GDP growth rate has been declining. It was 
5.1% in 2010, but only 1.1% in 2013 (The World Bank, 2014b). As Mexico seeks to return to 
faster rates of economic growth, the pollution-prone exploitation and commercialization of its 
natural resources threaten its environmental sustainability. Costs of pollution were estimated at 
approximately 5% of GDP in 2011, primarily due to the impact of air pollution on health in 
Mexico. According to the World Health Organization, more than 14,700 deaths were caused by 
air pollution in 2010, and nine of Mexico's cities are among the 20 most polluted on the planet. 
Mexico is thus highly motivated to reduce air pollution, not just to reduce climate change (which 
was made a goal when Mexico signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocols) but to save thousands of 
its citizens lives (Richter, 2013).  
The healthcare and related costs of pollution do not include the costs of government 
subsidies to the fossil fuel industry, which are not made public. However, fossil fuel subsidies 
are estimated to be many hundreds of millions of dollars annually (Makhijani, 2014).  
 In recent years, Mexico has taken major steps toward a greener economy. The current 
President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, has spoken about adopting the Inclusive Green Growth 
paradigm. He said, “The great promise of a better future for humanity is the ability to grow and 
create wealth without damaging our environment or our natural heritage” (RTCC, 2014). In 
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2014, it was a first-mover country in Latin America to implement a carbon tax and consider an 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) as shown in Figure 1 (World Bank, 2014c). 
 
Figure 1. Map of Existing, Emerging, and Potential Regional, National and Sub-National 
ETS and Carbon Tax Pricing Instruments 
 
 Source: The World Bank, 2014 
 
 President Nieto believes it is possible to both tackle climate change and achieve 
economic growth, implying he believes the often-stated “either-or” dilemma between increasing 
economic growth and improving the environment is false. This paper defines sustainable 
development as a condition when climate stabilization policies trigger innovative solutions that 
drive economic growth and offer social benefits. The question then becomes: What viable 
options are there for achieving all three of these goals for Mexico, followed by other Latin 
American countries? 
 
2. Literature Review 
Many countries have tried various options to reduce air pollution and provide a rich source of 
experience of workable alternatives, as well as lessons learned about unintended consequences 
and their accompanying possible mitigating actions. Countries have tried simple carbon taxes, 
various types of cap-and-trade schemes that allow companies to gain credits by supporting the 
reduction of pollution outside of their immediate area, and investments in clean energy projects. 
Since government-imposed carbon taxes are much simpler to implement than cap-and-trade 
schemes that need free-market inputs, many countries have started with straight taxes and then 
transitioned to cap-and-trade. 
 The Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat, 2014) introduced a 
carbon tax in Mexico in 2014 on the use of fossil fuels. The tax is, strictly speaking, not on total 





carbon content, but on the additional amount of emissions that would be generated if the subject 
fossil fuel were used instead of natural gas. The tax on natural gas is, therefore, zero. The rate is 
capped at 3% of the sales price of the fuel (The World Bank, 2014d). This policy aims at 
increasing awareness of CO2 emissions and encouraging the use of cleaner fuels and other green 
alternatives. The approximate carbon emissions price was set at $3.50/tCO2e (tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalents). The estimated revenue is roughly $1 billion per year. This price is 
relatively low. The 2013 cost per tCO2e in the European Union was about $6.70, $11.50 in 
California, and $15.75 in the United Kingdom for fuels to generate electricity. 
 Many companies are using even higher prices, called internal carbon prices, to plan for 
future investment decisions. For example, Shell uses a price of $40 per ton for projects with long 
lifetime, and it uses this number to plan budgets. Many companies anticipate that some 
governments may charge social costs of carbon in the future. The American government recently 
estimated the social cost at $37 per ton (The Economist, 2013). 
The Mexican government is considering additional policies to reduce pollution, including 
investment in clean energy research and development (R&D) and various market-based cap-and-
trade mechanisms. Three such schemes are discussed below. 
 
2.1 Carbon Taxation 
A carbon tax is a tax levied on the carbon content of fossil fuels (e.g., coal, oil, and natural gas). 
It provides a carbon emissions price in the economic system. Carbon taxes are intended to 
control emissions by establishing a fixed price that polluters must pay. High prices discourage 
pollution.  
 The Nordic countries first announced carbon taxes in the 1990s. Denmark started its 
program in 1992. The Danish carbon tax’s aim was to, “Increase the climate change profile and 
provide an economic incentive to consume less energy from carbon-intensive sources” (World 
Bank, 2014c). Although performance results have been mixed in other Nordic countries, 
Denmark showed a strong decline in energy use, 26% from 1990 to 2010 and a 25% decrease in 
CO2 emissions from 1993 to 2000 (World Bank). 
 The Danish carbon tax covers all consumption of fossil fuels and was introduced 
gradually to minimize effects on the competitiveness of industry. It was presented as part of a 
larger environmental tax package that includes energy taxes and subsidies for green investments. 
Since the purpose was not to increase the overall tax burden, the energy tax was lowered to offset 
the introduction of the carbon tax. Norway implemented a similar tax in 1991, to include coal, 
oil, and natural gas. It was found that a few industries had to be exempted, to preserve 
competitive positions, but the tax covers more than half of the total Norwegian CO2 emissions 
(World Bank, 2014c).  
 Switzerland also has a carbon tax. Companies are allowed to switch to a cap-and-trade 
system but not many companies have done so. The tax has enabled it to meet its Kyoto Protocol 
commitments. Proceeds from the tax are returned to citizens, in the form of discounts on health 
insurance and building renovations to make them “greener.” 
Two benefits of a “pure” carbon tax are that it is relatively simple to administer and it 
gives the state immediate revenue.  In contrast, market-based systems can take years to define 
and implement. During a conference on the economics of carbon taxes at the American 
Enterprise Institute, Williams (2012) presented his research results on choosing among carbon 
mitigation policies, including carbon taxes, emissions trading, and traditional environmental 
policies (including clean energy standards, electricity emission taxes, efficiency policies, higher 
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motor fuel taxes, phased oil taxes, and tighter fuel economy standards). He found that a carbon 
tax has the least management costs per ton, with the highest relative emissions reduction. 
Critics of a carbon tax, which may include powerful industries, have made accusations 
that it can make companies non-competitive and may force industries to leave the country and 
set up in untaxed locations (a consequence known as “leakage”). Fischer et al. (2012) provided 
options for mitigating adverse carbon tax impacts on manufacturing industries and examined 
partial or full exemption from carbon taxes, output based rebates (OBR), border carbon 
adjustment (BCA), and other options. They found border carbon adjustment to be an effective 
method of addressing leakage. An import-based BCA requires importers to pay a carbon tax 
equivalent to that of local production and can thus avoid the loss of exports. 
Studies showed that other safety mechanisms should also be considered, including 
phasing in the tax slowly so industry can adapt to it, and meeting with industry to consider tax 
reductions or exemptions for any companies that would in fact become uncompetitive. Studies 
by the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and others have shown that the impact on a 
country’s GDP of a carbon tax that is carefully implemented is normally very minor (Bowen, 
2011; Carolyn et al., 2012).  
In general, it was found that a carbon tax shows promise in improving the environment, 
but other policies may have a more positive impact on economic growth, as well as social 
benefits in Mexico. In 2013, 14 countries had a fixed carbon tax. Prior to 2013, more countries 
had fixed taxation but transitioned over time to a market-based system (World Bank, 2014d). 
 
2.2 Market-Based Systems  
The World Bank’s (2014c) Report on the State and Trends of Carbon Pricing follows the 
evolution of carbon pricing, and explains different instruments and approaches. Two common 
market-based mechanisms are the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) and the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Both of these are commonly called an ETS or cap-and-
trade program. They are managed by the governing jurisdiction that sets an emissions limit, the 
“cap,” but leaves it to the negotiations of the market (i.e., the “trade”) to set the price of the 
carbon. It was first used in the U.S., as a part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, to 
reduce dangerous levels of SO2-caused acid rain resulting from coal-fired power plants.  
This type of pollution reduction system provides permits for pollution, and a spot market 
to trade such permits. A cap-and-trade system generally has a set goal and schedule for the total 
amounts of carbon emissions across a wide area, but the price for a specific pollution source can 
remain flexible. It can thus reduce the economic impact that a pollution quota might have on a 
specific business, while ensuring that quotas are met at regional and international levels. 
 There may be circumstances where a totally free cap-and-trade system may be harmful. 
For instance, companies in Norway (where emission reduction tends to be expensive) could 
choose not to curtail their own pollution at all, but to simply buy carbon credits from far-away 
countries where pollution reduction is far cheaper; this could lead to excessive local carbon 
emissions. For such cases, and for occasions when there are wide swings in economic conditions 
(e.g., inflation and deflation), a floor (i.e., a minimum level) for local reductions may be 
beneficial. 
 Another problem with market-based systems was evinced by the EU ETS, established in 
2005. The carbon price started at $38/tCO2e and remained fairly stable for a while, but then 
underwent a wild downswing as a result of the international economic crisis that started in 2008, 
which caused a supply-demand imbalance. The reduced emissions in the system due to less fossil 





fuel usage led to an overly high supply of allowances and a carbon price drop of over 80%. The 
EU is now looking for long-term solutions to this problem. Its short-term measure to strengthen 
the ETS was to implement "back loading" of 900 million allowances, that is, to defer assessing 
payments due until the end of a significant time period. The EU Allowances system is an 
extremely complex financial infrastructure and has led companies to buy “futures” in credits in 
case their prices rise or they may not be available at certain periods. 
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) works similar to the EU ETS. Generally, a 
polluting entity from a developed country can earn Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits 
for investing in projects in a developing country, and each credit is equivalent to a ton of CO2. 
CER credits are intended to count towards meeting Kyoto Protocol targets. As is the case for the 
EU ETS, CDM credits can be bought and sold. Though the EU ETS is run by the EU, the CDM 
and its related Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism is administered by the UN. The four chief 
benefactors of the CDM in 2013 were China, India, Brazil and Mexico; the largest investor into 
the system is the UK (United Nations, 2014). 
The World Bank examined the CDM, EU ETS and other market-based systems, and 
found that such carbon pricing instruments can be effective. However, market-based systems do 
not always work in the manner or to the extent expected. It reported that instruments can be 
designed to be more cost-effective and flexible; linking can influence market behavior; levers 
that work for the private sector do not always deliver at government level; and that policy 
designers need to take systemic overlaps and interactions into account (World Bank, 2014c). 
By 2013, 35 countries (including 28 in the EU) and a total of 20 states and provinces had 
enacted emissions trading programs; together, these cover about 8.5% of global Green House 
Gases (GHG) emissions (World Bank, 2014c). 
 
2.3 Revenue Distribution from Carbon Levies 
 Some claim that environmental protection policies are regressive because they raise 
prices for the lower income classes and eliminate jobs. Slogans such as, “This will raise prices!” 
and, “Jobs will be lost!” have been popular in TV campaign ads by industries when fighting 
environmental initiatives. A recent example of such accusations took place when the oil and gas 
industry spent millions to attack anti-fracking initiatives in Santa Barbara and San Bernardino 
counties in California (Cart, 2014). Similarly, Australians recently voted a prime minister out of 
office on the issue of carbon taxation. 
 Industry opponents played up the word “taxes” pejoratively, and the opposition candidate 
promised to, “Ax the tax.” The new government promptly got rid of the country’s anti-carbon 
program, although two-thirds of Australian voters believe there should be a limit on carbon 
emissions. The California and Australia cases illustrate that voters may be emotionally swayed 
against carbon limits unless they can see near-term and understandable benefits, especially if 
powerful interests (oil companies in California and coal companies in Australia) use massive 
media buys to fight anti-pollution initiatives (Baird, 2014). 
 Although levies on carbon (whether a straight tax or ETF) can be regressive, there are 
ways to mitigate impacts. Williams (2014) and Gonzales (2012) found that the major 
determinant of the distributional effects of a carbon tax across income groups arises from the 
methods by which that revenue is recycled. For example, voters in California and Germany, 
where energy taxes are recycled to benefit the populace, have been supportive of carbon 
reduction initiatives, which have created many new jobs. Similarly, Costa Rica’s revenues from 
its recently initiated carbon trading program are being used to pay thousands of landowners for 
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reforestation and green energy projects. They also fund a bank (aptly named BanCO2!) for low-
cost financing of energy-efficient cars and home energy retrofits. These are examples of high-
visibility benefits that proved popular.  
 Gonzales (2012) examined other options for spending the proceeds from carbon 
emissions in Mexico, including a manufacturing tax-cut and food subsidies. He determined that 
costs are distributed regressively when revenue is recycled as a manufacturing tax and 
progressively when it is recycled as a food subsidy for the less wealthy. However, studies have 
shown that providing subsidized foods to poor or rural areas can negatively affect crop prices of 
local farmers and damage the economy (Oxfam, 2005). Neither of these two policies, thus, 
appears to be an attractive way to spend carbon revenues, compared to the strategy employed by 
Costa Rica and others, to stimulate local green initiatives.  
 Bowen (2011) analyzed different carbon pricing strategies. His policy recommendations 
included investing in R&D to promote innovation and appropriate infrastructure improvements, 
and funding for renewable energy projects.  
 
3. Policy Analysis and Options 
Mexico is moving ahead on carbon tax initiatives in order to reduce global climate change and its 
own high level of pollution. Its emissions level in 2010 was about 661 megatons of CO2e, and its 
pledged emissions level for 2020 is 672 megatons, which is 30% below Business as Usual (BAU 
) levels. The current trajectory (unless the planned actions are actually put in place) for 2020 
indicates a level of 800-845 MtCO2e, which would substantially increase health costs and deaths 
from air pollution and other greenhouse gas effects. This is, therefore, a high-priority issue for 
Mexico. Major portions of its economy and tens of thousands of lives are at risk.  
 As stated, the strategic objective of Mexico’s government is to achieve sustainable 
development, defined as a condition when climate stabilization policies trigger innovative 
solutions that drive economic growth and offer social benefits. As a result, the evaluative criteria 
for climate policy options should include: economic growth (renewable energy investment and 
job creation), social benefits (better health), and environmental improvement (reaching the 
desired CO2 emission level and reducing air pollution). The aforementioned literature indicated 
three major policy options for Mexico that could achieve these criteria. These are reviewed 
below, with the assumption that similar conclusions could be drawn for other, though not 
necessarily all, Latin American countries. 
 
3.1 A Carbon Pricing Option 
A carbon tax has many advantages. First, the tax provides immediate revenue for the 
government, estimated at over $1 billion for Mexico. Second, it can be simple, transparent, and 
cost efficient. Third, a carbon tax provides an incentive to reduce emissions from present fossil 
fuel energy sources and encourages the use of more efficient alternatives. Finally, it can be an 
effective first step to carbon reduction before getting into the full complexities of an ETS.  
Disadvantages include the possible decline of industrial competitiveness, uncertain 
emissions target, and the potential pushback of industry and consumers if they perceive they are 
being “taxed” only for vague, futuristic goals. The present Mexican implementation of a carbon 
tax appears to encourage moving to natural gas rather than green energy, since gas is not taxed, 
and is often cheaper than renewable energy alternatives. An inclusion of natural gas (as is 
practiced by Norway, Denmark, and others) in the taxation should be considered for the future. 
Without such an inclusion, Mexico cannot grow with “sustainable” energy, as is the stated goal. 





The experience of other countries with a carbon tax, evaluated by the aforementioned 
criteria, is as follows: a) it is effective for environmental improvement (it reduced air pollution 
but may not have reached desired CO2 emission level); b) it creates social benefits (better health); 
but c) it has little or no impact on economic growth, especially job creation. 
 
3.2 An ETS Option for Mexico 
An ETS can help achieve meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions levels, since it is 
goal-oriented toward a maximum pre-determined emissions level. An ETS can be cost-effective 
because it recognizes that some companies can be more effective at reducing emissions than 
others and allows competitive market forces, rather than bureaucracy, to make adjustments while 
assuring the final goal. An ETS can also generate revenue for the government, although the 
amount may not be as predictable as income from a pure-form carbon tax. 
 One ETS disadvantage is that it can encourage industries that are addicted to fossil fuels 
to pollute more because it is possible to purchase cheap offsets or carbon credits rather than 
switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy. An ETS is complex to setup and administer, even 
with initial experience with a carbon tax system. It is also subject to major external shocks such 
as recessions, which can result in unpredictable carbon pricing and planning difficulties for 
industry.  
 For the three criteria, an ETS would a) benefit the environment (by decreasing air 
pollution, and presumably reach a desirable CO2 emission level); b) would offer the social 
benefit of better health, from better air; and c) it has minor effects on economic growth, with 
negligible job creation.  
The experience of other countries with an ETS that reacts purely to prices has been that 
no new or innovative technology has been produced, and the cheapest off-the-shelf renewable 
energy systems are usually imported and used. Without government support, the advancement of 
sustainable energy in Mexico with this option is liable to be limited, especially in rapidly 
evolving green technologies, such as renewable energy (RE) storage, micro-grids, RE linked to 
water purification or desalination, and non-opaque solar cells. 
 
3.3 An ETS with Revenues Dedicated to Clean Energy 
The benefits of an ETS, as well as its challenges, were aforementioned. If Mexico evolved from 
its carbon tax system to an ETS and earmarked the resultant revenues for true green energy (not 
natural gas) projects, that could provide many potential opportunities. This is the only option that 
meets all three criteria. It a) supports environmental improvement (both by reducing CO2 to the 
desired level and air pollution); b) offers social benefits, including better health; and c) supports 
significant economic growth, including creating jobs by providing the tax revenues for green 
energy projects, including innovative research for pollution reduction via carbon storage or water 
purification systems. R&D funding of RE projects could advance the goal of making Mexico’s 
economic growth sustainable. 
 Such funding could be greatly leveraged by not having the government pay the entire bill, 
but by forming Public Private Partnerships (P3) with industry. Experience has shown that 
leverage of 10:1 for green energy projects is possible with this schema; that is, the provision of 
$1 million by government for a project could attract $10 million from private industry (Cellucci 
& Grove, 2011). Energy is an especially good candidate for this, as RE is often marginally 10% 
more expensive than fossil fuel competitors. With the P3 support from government making up 
the difference, industry could be assured of successful competition for projects. 
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In short, Option 3 appears to have the greatest payoff for Mexico, and the best chance of 
helping it meet its goals for increasing economic growth sustainably, obtaining social benefits 
and reducing pollution both within the country and on a global basis. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Air pollution is a serious threat to the health and economic development of Latin America. Over 
100 million people are breathing dangerously polluted air; over 14,700 deaths were caused by air 
pollution in Mexico alone in 2010 (Maxwell, 2013). The new government of Mexico, under 
President Nieto, has pledged to accelerate the drive to cut pollution,  increase clean energy use, 
and reduce emissions by 30% by 2020 (Leme, 2014). To reach this goal, the Mexican 
government has implemented a carbon tax and is examining a market-based ETS. A carbon tax 
has been shown to be effective—if it is carefully managed and does not hurt the competitiveness 
of local industries (EU, 2013).  
An even better energy policy option appears to be a transition to an ETS, with resultant 
revenues dedicated to developing green projects in Mexico, including innovative R&D to reduce 
pollution and produce clean energy on a continuous basis. The funding’s effect could be 
multiplied by creating a P3 for R&D, critical to the nation and profitable for the investors. 
 If Mexico follows through on its announced initiatives, it could provide a model for other 
Latin American countries, which have made progress in some, but not all, of these areas. Brazil 
has expanded its clean energy, to 15% of its total consumption. Chile plans to increase RE to 
20% of its total by 2020. Uruguay is starting major solar and wind projects. However, none of 
the other Latin countries appears to be as advanced as Mexico, with its comprehensive ambitions 
for pollution reduction and renewables support. It could, thus, serve as a model for success, if its 
leadership follows up on its promises. Vig et al. (1999) remind us that environmental policy 
develops under leadership rather than by public opinion. Mexico is showing Latin America and 
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